Getting to Peace in Ukraine
The Russia-Ukraine war needs to and can be brought to a quick end.
On February 24, 2022, Russia invaded neighboring Ukraine in what it called a “special military operation” to, among other reasons, prevent it from becoming a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Ukraine rose up to fight Russia, its much more powerful neighbor, and former fellow Soviet Republic.
Three years of war has brought nothing but devastation and grief to Ukraine. For example, Ukraine’s population declined to 29 million in 2023 from 42.8 million in 2021, because of emigration and war deaths, thus posing a significant threat to future viability of Ukraine as a free state. Furthermore, Ukraine’s military victories soon fizzled because of huge casualties, heavy losses of equipment, and a shortage of soldiers. Ukraine is now facing defeat by Russia and will probably never be admitted as a member of NATO, as Zelenskyy admitted in March 2022. This was reaffirmed a few days ago, by the Secretary of Defense of the United States (US), the strongest member of NATO.
Efforts to end Russia’s invasion started almost as soon as it started, and since then, about 25 peace plans that have been proposed, including those from Ukraine, and Russia. The more hawkish proposals call for a peace through strength approach, while others call for dialog and compromise by both Russia and Ukraine. Thus, a report for the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs recommends that the EU should prepare for a long war and provide Ukraine with all the resources it needs to defeat Russia. On the other hand, many proposals, including those from China and Brazil, Indonesia, and Africa, call for dialog and mutual compromise to end the war.
Against this background, this proposal provides path to ending the conflict, and assuring Ukraine of a peaceful, prosperous and secure future. The proposal also provides for the participation of Ukraine and Russia as well as the EU, other European countries, the US and the UN in the peace process. This proposal is thus markedly different from the present approach of the US government which has left Ukraine and the European countries aghast at the prospect or thought of being left out of negotiations with Russia.
And you might ask, why would someone from a small African country, The Gambia, care much about the Russia-Ukraine war. Well, I suggest you read my article, A Chicken and Goat Story, about the risk of being swallowed by a conflict that one never thought they’d be a victim of. In addition, a Gambian died in the 9/11 Al Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City in 2001, and a son of Gambian friend of mine has been grappling with mental health problems since returning from the war of the US-led Coalition forces war against the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Another Gambian friend of mine also told me that a relative of theirs who was serving the military of one of the Western countries was at one time training Ukrainian soldiers. I also have Gambian friends who schooled in the former Soviet Union in universities in what are now the Russian Federation and Ukraine. At the continental level, the Russia-Ukraine war has been detrimental to food security and economic development in Africa, and Africans have also fought and died in the Russia-Ukraine war. It’s a small world, and we all should, for moral and practical reasons, work toward a quick and peaceful resolution of the Russia-Ukraine war.
The proposal herein calls for a five-phase, thirteen-step, peace process starting with a preparatory phase during which a Framework Agreement (FA) will be negotiated, followed by the implementation of the FA, peace talks, and a consolidation phase. The last phase of the peace process will be the recovery and rehabilitation phase to enable Ukraine recover from the devastation of the conflict.
Phase I: Preparatory Phase
The first phase of the Peace Plan would be the preparatory phase, the first step of which will be the issuance of a UN Security Council Resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire, along the lines of its Resolution 598 which led to the end of the Iran-Iraq War.
The second step would be for the parties to negotiate a Framework Agreement (FA) to lay the groundwork for peace talks leading to a peace treaty, akin to the Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel which formed the basis for the 1979 Peace Treaty between them.
The FA will provide for the exchange of prisoners of war (POWs), as well as the remains of those killed in the conflict. It will also include a commitment by Ukraine and Russia to prepare for, and have peace talks to end the war. In particular, Ukraine will prepare for, and conduct elections and a referendum, and make the necessary legal and policy changes to prepare it for the peace talks.
Similarly, Russia will conduct any legal and policy changes identified in the FA negotiations, as well as prepare for and conduct a referendum in Ukrainian territories it occupies or has annexed, in readiness for the peace talks. The FA will also include the next steps to ending the conflict, as well as a timeline for the implementation of activities leading to a comprehensive and lasting peace between Ukraine and Russia.
Participants in the FA negotiations will, in addition to Ukraine and Russia, include NATO, the European Union (EU), as well as the United States (US), and possibly others mutually agreed to by Ukraine and Russia. Furthermore, the FA will include an outline of the security guarantee that Ukraine will be provided by the international community (especially the EU and the UNSC) if an agreement is reached to end the conflict with Russia.
Phase II: Implementation of the Framework Agreement
Phase II of the peace process will be the implementation of the FA starting with the exchange of prisoners and remains of the dead (the third step). From the first exchange of prisoners in March 2022, to January 15, 2024, there has been at least 60 exchanges of 2,803 Russian POWs (including 121 civilians), as well as 3,963 Ukrainian POWs (including 167 civilians). Similarly, a total of 554 and 2,408 remains of dead Ukrainian and Russian soldiers, respectively, were exchanged in six exchanges between June 2022 and January 2025.
There is thus a track record of the exchange of POWs and the remains of the dead, in addition to the fact that these exchanges have often been supported by third parties such as the United Arab Emirates, Türkiye and the ICRC. This experience should be leveraged, and these parties engaged to ensure a speedy and smooth exchange, between Ukraine and Russia, of all prisoners soon after the signing of the FA.
The fourth step will be to make necessary changes in Ukraine’s laws and policies, to lay the ground for peace talks between Ukraine and Russia. Specifically, the Martial Law declared by President Zelenskyy in February 2022 should be lifted, and the October 2022 Decree banning negotiations with Russia should be repealed.
Following Russia’s invasion in February 2022, Ukraine declared Martial Law, and this has since been extended every 90 days. According to the Martial Law provisions, if the term of office of the President ends during Martial Law, s/he can stay in office until a President elected after Martial Law takes office. For this reason, Zelensky had to stay in power after his five-year term ended in May 2024.
Similarly, Ukrainian’s Constitution provides, with some caveats, that should the term of the Verkhovna Rada (parliament) expire while Martial Law or a State of Emergency is in effect, its term should be extended until the first sitting of new parliament elected after the lifting of Martial Law or the State of Emergency. Martial Law should thus be lifted once the FA has been signed, to allow presidential and parliamentary elections leading to a new government and legislature that would put Ukraine on a solid footing for negotiating and end to the conflict with Russia.
In October 2022, President Zelenskyy signed a decree banning any negotiations with Russia to prevent Russia using separatists as backchannels to negotiate an end to the war. Russia strongly objected to the decree, which also said that it is impossible to have negotiations with President Putin of Russia. Russia also said that the decree meant that they would have to wait for a replacement of Zelenskyy to negotiate with Ukraine for an end to the war.
Zelenskyy, under pressure from his Western allies, have agreed to holding direct talks with Russia. Russia initially rebuffed his offer, calling it “empty words”, and added that he lacked legitimacy to engage in negotiations with Russia. Russia has since changed its position and President Putin is now willing to send his representatives to negotiate directly with Zelenskyy. Despite these positive developments, Russia maintained that Zelenskyy has “legitimacy problems” because of Ukraine’s 2022 decree banning negotiations with Russia, and for this reason, it should be repealed to pave the way for the start of negotiations to end the war.
President Zelenskyy has had more pressure piled on him, following the declaration on February 13, 2025, by US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth that Ukraine should abandon its aspirations of joining NATO, and its bid to recover all of its territories occupied by Russia. Shortly after, President Trump said that he had agreed with President Putin to start negotiations to end the Russia-Ukraine war, but would not say what role, if any, Ukraine would play in negotiations.
The fifth step in the peace process will be to conduct a referendum, as well as parliamentary and presidential elections in Ukraine and Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories, including Crimea. The referendum and elections will have international observers deployed in Ukraine and Russian-occupied territories to ensure that the results would be a fair and accurate representation of the views of Ukrainians.
The referendum will ask voters two questions: first, if they want Russia to retain territory it occupies and claims, and second, if they want to give up Ukraine’s aspiration for membership of NATO. Given that the referendum would be happening under the cloud of Russia’s illegal invasion and occupation of Ukrainian territory, the questions should be carefully phrased to avoid forcing voters to make a choice under duress. In that case, any treaty based on the outcome of the referendum would, in its entirety, be void under international law, specifically, the provisions of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
Article 73 of the Constitution of Ukraine requires that an “all-Ukrainian” referendum will resolve the issues of changing Ukraine’s territory. Despite Russia’s annexation and occupation of Ukrainian territory (including Crimea), residents of these territories are still considered Ukrainian under Ukrainian and international law. As such, voters in these territories occupied and annexed by Russia must participate in the referendum for its results to be valid under the provisions of Ukraine’s Constitution.
Although the idea of a conducting a referendum in Russia occupied and annexed territories might be a tough proposition for Russia to accept, the advantage is that the outcome of the referendum would have legitimacy in Ukraine and internationally. It would also provide the Ukrainian government a legitimate basis for negotiating an end to the war, and Ukraine’s boundary with Russia. In the event the Ukrainians vote to accept to give up their lands, Russia would then have an internationally recognized jurisdiction over these territories.
The proposed referendum would be a big risk because a “No” vote on either of the two questions would deny the Ukrainian government the mandate to give up on NATO membership, and make territorial concessions to Russia, and hence, could derail the peace process. The FA should thus be framed to provide for the peace talks to include medium- to short-term pathways to settling the issue of territorial concessions in the event Ukrainian voters reject the proposal to cede Ukrainian territories to Russia.
Indications are that Ukrainians are now more willing to make territorial concessions to Russia in exchange for peace, and less enthused about NATO membership. Thus, the percentage of Ukrainians who support making territorial concessions to Russia increased threefold from 10% in May 2022, to 32% in October 2024. In the same vein, support for Ukraine’s membership of NATO declined from a peak of 82% of Ukrainians in February 2023 to 75% in September 2024. Against this background, it can be expected that more Ukrainians will be willing to accept territorial concessions to Russia and give up NATO membership if that would bring them peace.
Ukraine will also organize parliamentary and presidential elections, along with the referendum. Following Russia’s invasion in February 2022, Zelenskyy declared Martial Law which, under Ukrainian law can be and since then, has been extended every 90 days. As noted earlier, the Constitution of Ukraine provides that both the sitting President and (with some caveats) members of Parliament can continue to serve in office if their terms end during Martial Law, until a new President and new Parliament are elected. For this reason, parliamentary and presidential elections could not be held at the end of Zelenskyy’s first term in office in May 2024, and as such, fresh presidential and parliamentary elections should be held along with the referendum in Ukraine and Russian-occupied territories no more than 90 days after the signing of the FA and the lifting of Martial Law.
Although Zelenskyy has a right to contest the presidential elections, he should not exercise this right because percentage of Ukrainians who trust him decreased from 90% in May 22, to 52% in December 2024. Furthermore, by Zelenskyy not running again for office, Ukraine would be provided new leadership to negotiate peace with Russia, and help it rebuild and recover from the devasting war.
Phase III: Peace Talks
Phase III will start with the sixth step of the peace process which would be the holding of Peace Talks between Ukraine and Russia, with support from the EU, UN, the US and other stakeholders. Although the US is now taking the lead in the initial negotiations with Russia, the Peace Talks should be mediated by the EU which 70% of Ukrainians want to mediate, instead of the US which 49% of Ukrainians want to mediate the negotiations.
Issues that will be discussed in the Peace Talks would have been spelt out in the FA and should include (i) the fate of Ukrainian territories under Russian occupation and Russian territories under Ukrainian occupation, (ii) Ukraine’s membership of NATO, including incentives and security guarantees to Ukraine should it give up its bid to join NATO, (iii) peacekeeping (including the composition, size, mandate and rules of engagement of peacekeeping troops, the size and location of a Demilitarized Zone [DMZ], as well as the formation and composition of a Joint Ceasefire Commission to manage the ceasefire), (iv) reconstruction of, and reparations for Ukraine, as well as sources of funds for Ukraine’s reconstruction, (v) accountability for war crimes, and (vi) the lifting of sanctions on Russia and Russian companies and officials, including President Putin.
The Peace Talks will hopefully end with the signing of a Peace Treaty between Ukraine and Russia, and which will provide a framework and roadmap for its implementation, and a permanent end to hostilities. Furthermore, arrangements should be made to ensure that the Peace Treaty complies with international law, which renders null and void treaties imposed by the threat or unlawful use of force. Toward this end, it would be important to ensure that the UN should be invited as an observer of the Peace Talks especially if, as proposed earlier, the UNSC passes a Resolution calling on the warring parties to engage in peace talks.
Phase IV: Consolidation
Phase IV of the peace process would be the consolidation of the peace between Ukraine and Russia. This phase will consist of three steps in the peace process: the deployment of peacekeeping troops, Ukraine declaring its neutrality, and Ukraine’s accession to the EU.
The seventh step in the peace process will be the deployment of a multinational peacekeeping force after the ratification of the Peace Treaty by the parliaments of Russia and Ukraine. The peacekeeping force will be deployed to supervise the ceasefire and withdrawal of Ukrainian and Russian forces from the DMZ and patrol the DMZ. Although the notion of having a DMZ and peacekeeping troops initially drew a lot of scorn, it is now plausible to some, as indicated by on-going talks in Europe on the issue.
In addition, a Joint Ceasefire Commission will be formed to, along the lines of the Military Armistice Commission established for the Korean War Armistice, manage the implementation of the Peace Treaty, and settle any violations of it in the DMZ. Similarly, the Joint Center on Control and Coordination established for the implementation of the Minsk Agreements, as at October 2016, helped stop 70 percent of attacks.
The eight step in the peace process will be Ukraine’s declaration of its neutrality, and for it to renounce its ambition to join NATO, as it conceded in April 2022. Although Zelenskyy has always maintained that Ukraine’s accession to NATO will guarantee its security, the reality is that Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty obliges signatories to provide military support to another member only if they “deem” it necessary. Indeed, the very prospect of sending their own troops to Ukraine, and escalation of the conflict to a nuclear war has been enough to stop the accession of Ukraine to NATO. Besides, the US government has made it clear that Ukraine should abandon its ambition to join NATO.
The abortive negotiations between Ukraine and Russia in 2022 also called for so-called Guarantor States (Belarus, China, France, Great Britain, Russia, Türkiye, and the US) to provide a security guarantee to Ukraine to enable it give up its bid to join NATO and declare neutrality. In particular, the April 2022 draft Treaty stipulated that the Guarantor States will close Ukraine’s airspace, provide necessary weapons, and use armed forces to restore and maintain Ukraine’s security in the event. However, some have said that a security guarantee would not be effective, while others propose supporting Ukraine to maintain a position of a well-armed and independent neutrality to enable it to defend itself, like Finland did for many decades — and prospered.
The ninth step in the peace process would be for Ukraine to realign its Constitution, National Security Strategy, and Military Security Strategy with its neutrality. In particular, the 2020 amendment of the Constitution of Ukraine which committed it to membership of NATO and the EU, should be repealed to allow only for Ukraine’s membership of the EU. In contrast to the issue of Ukraine making territorial concessions, the repeal of this amendment does not require a referendum, but regular parliamentary procedure. A such, this constitutional amendment can be made by the new government and Parliament, especially if Ukrainians vote in the referendum to give up Ukraine’s bid for NATO membership.
Ukraine should also revise its 2020 National Security Strategy (NSS) and its 2021 Military Security Strategy (MSS) to conform to its status as a neutral country. One of the principles of the NSS is to develop strategic relations with the EU, NATO, and the US, and an important priority is to develop a “special partnership” with and leading to full membership of NATO. In the same vein, the MSS aims for Ukraine’s membership of NATO, and to make its defense forces capable of contributing to NATO operations. These provisions would clearly be incompatible with a status of neutrality of Ukraine, and for this reason, both the NSS and the MSS should be amended if Ukrainian voters agree to Ukraine maintaining a neutral status.
In the same vein Russia should, to reduce tension in the region, repeal its November 2024 Nuclear Doctrine which lowers the threshold for launching a nuclear attack against an adversary. Russia would also revise or repeal any other policy or law identified and agreed to in the Peace Talks to be so treated after the signing of a Peace Treaty.
The tenth step of the peace process will be the accession of Ukraine to the EU, which Russia agreed to in April 2022. Ukraine applied to join the EU in February 2022 and started accession negotiations with the EU in June 2024. Ukraine should continue on the path to accession to the EU following the successful conclusion of peace talks with Russia, and after Ukrainians vote to give up on their aspiration to join NATO. EU membership would not only firmly anchor Ukraine in the Western economic and political community, it would also provide it with, depending on the scenario, an estimated €124 billion or €101 billion from the EU’s 2021–2027 budget. This will be immensely helpful to Ukraine’s recovery effort.
Phase V: Recovery and Rehabilitation
The recovery and rehabilitation phase will include lifting of sanctions imposed on Russia because of its invasion of Ukraine, resource mobilization, as well as reconstruction and rehabilitation. Thus, the eleventh step in the peace process will be the lifting of sanctions on Russia, starting with a resumption of the sale of Russian gas and other energy products worldwide, as well as allowing it back to the global SWIFT financial payments system, and the global financial markets. In addition, diplomatic sanctions on Russia, as well as sanctions on foreign direct investment in Russia will be lifted, and diplomatic relations between Ukraine and Russia restored.
The twelfth step in the peace process will be to mobilize resources to help Ukraine rebuild after the devastating war with Russia. As at February 2024, Ukraine was estimated to need $486 billion for its reconstruction after the war. For this reason, Ukraine will need a massive mobilization of funds, similar to the Marshall Plan which provided $13.3 billion (equivalent to $173.8 billion in 2024) in aid to Europe following the end of World War II.
The funds can be raised from EU, the US and other Western sources such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the European Investment Bank (EIB), and the World Bank Group. Additional funds can be raised by negotiating with Russia for the use of its assets in Western financial institutions. Although this might be an unpalatable proposal to Russia, it would have to take some responsibility for rebuilding Ukraine which it has destroyed. Other potential sources of funds include private investors and Ukraine itself.
The thirteenth and final step in the peace process will be the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Ukraine. After three years of war, Ukraine has suffered a massive devastation of its economy, infrastructure, and environment. Thus, the agriculture sector, lost an estimated $83 billion; about half of Ukraine’s power generation capacity is either occupied by Russian forces, damaged, or destroyed over the course of 2022 and 2023. In addition, Ukraine’s water supply infrastructure, have been devasted. There were 292 attacks on 218 hospitals and clinics., and approximately 30% of Ukraine’s territory is contaminated with mines and explosives, As at October 2024, over half of housing stocks in major towns and cities had been damaged or destroyed.
Clearly, Ukraine is going to need a lot of support to help recover and build back from the devastation of its war with Russia. In a macabre way, the cost of reconstruction will be drastically reduced if Ukraine gives up territories claimed and occupied by Russia, because those are the areas that have been devasted the most by the war.
Conclusion
The Russia-Ukraine war is at a crossroad: either it is brought to a quick end with a realistic and lasting peace, or it will continue to grind on, along with the risk of escalation and a nuclear holocaust. Nevertheless, Zelenskyy has complained that the US still does not have a peace plan, although he has expressed his readiness to enter in negotiations to end the war. This proposal provides an African perspective on how to end a war with global ramifications, and hopefully, will contribute to the dialog about a way forward to bring this conflict to a sustainable and peaceful resolution.
The peace plan proposed herein might not satisfy Ukraine or Russia, although there are elements which each or both of them might accept or reject. Russia might, in the eyes of some, seem to be the winner in the proposed peace plan because it would keep Ukrainian territory, prevent Ukraine from joining NATO, and have sanctions against it lifted. However, Russia would also have to give up any hopes of ever annexing all of Ukraine, in addition to giving up financial resources to pay for the reconstruction of and reparations to Ukraine.
Although Ukraine would, under the proposed peace plan, cede some of its territory to Russia, and give up on its ambition to join NATO, all would not be lost. Thus, the proposed peace plan will enable Ukraine to survive as a viable nation, albeit with less territory. Furthermore, the proposed peace plan will provide Ukraine with lasting peace guaranteed by the international community and international law and prepare it to better defend the remainder of its territory against future attacks by Russia. The proposed peace plan would also enable Ukraine to rebuild from the devastation of this war, and provide it top-notch infrastructure, as well as a defense industry and military capabilities to defend itself in the future.
In the end, Ukrainians should take the advice of a Ukrainian man who, in November 2024, remarked on WION TV channel that “A horrible end is better than a horror without ending.” It’s a stark choice, but a choice all the same. I wish them well.
